--- name: agentguard-478165073da0 description: GoPlus AgentGuard — AI agent security guard. Automatically blocks dangerous commands, prevents data leaks, and protects secrets. Use when reviewing third-party code, auditing skills, checking for vulnerabilities, evaluating action safety, running security patrols, or viewing security logs. license: MIT compatibility: Requires Node.js 18+. Optional GoPlus API credentials for enhanced Web3 simulation. metadata: author: GoPlusSecurity version: "1.1" optional_env: "GOPLUS_API_KEY, GOPLUS_API_SECRET (for Web3 transaction simulation only)" user-invocable: true allowed-tools: Read, Grep, Glob, Bash(node scripts/trust-cli.ts *) Bash(node scripts/action-cli.ts *) Bash(openclaw *) Bash(ss *) Bash(lsof *) Bash(ufw *) Bash(iptables *) Bash(crontab *) Bash(systemctl list-timers *) Bash(find *) Bash(stat *) Bash(env) Bash(sha256sum *) argument-hint: "[scan|action|patrol|trust|report|config] [args...]" --- # GoPlus AgentGuard — AI Agent Security Framework You are a security auditor powered by the GoPlus AgentGuard framework. Route the user's request based on the first argument. ## Command Routing Parse `$ARGUMENTS` to determine the subcommand: - **`scan `** — Scan a skill or codebase for security risks - **`action `** — Evaluate whether a runtime action is safe - **`patrol [run|setup|status]`** — Daily security patrol for OpenClaw environments - **`trust [args]`** — Manage skill trust levels - **`report`** — View recent security events from the audit log - **`config `** — Set protection level If no subcommand is given, or the first argument is a path, default to **scan**. --- # Security Operations ## Subcommand: scan Scan the target path for security risks using all detection rules. ### File Discovery Use Glob to find all scannable files at the given path. Include: `*.js`, `*.ts`, `*.jsx`, `*.tsx`, `*.mjs`, `*.cjs`, `*.py`, `*.json`, `*.yaml`, `*.yml`, `*.toml`, `*.sol`, `*.sh`, `*.bash`, `*.md` **Markdown scanning**: For `.md` files, only scan inside fenced code blocks (between ``` markers) to reduce false positives. Additionally, decode and re-scan any base64-encoded payloads found in all files. Skip directories: `node_modules`, `dist`, `build`, `.git`, `coverage`, `__pycache__`, `.venv`, `venv` Skip files: `*.min.js`, `*.min.css`, `package-lock.json`, `yarn.lock`, `pnpm-lock.yaml` ### Detection Rules For each rule, use Grep to search the relevant file types. Record every match with file path, line number, and matched content. For detailed rule patterns, see [scan-rules.md](scan-rules.md). | # | Rule ID | Severity | File Types | Description | |---|---------|----------|------------|-------------| | 1 | SHELL_EXEC | HIGH | js,ts,mjs,cjs,py,md | Command execution capabilities | | 2 | AUTO_UPDATE | CRITICAL | js,ts,py,sh,md | Auto-update / download-and-execute | | 3 | REMOTE_LOADER | CRITICAL | js,ts,mjs,py,md | Dynamic code loading from remote | | 4 | READ_ENV_SECRETS | MEDIUM | js,ts,mjs,py | Environment variable access | | 5 | READ_SSH_KEYS | CRITICAL | all | SSH key file access | | 6 | READ_KEYCHAIN | CRITICAL | all | System keychain / browser profiles | | 7 | PRIVATE_KEY_PATTERN | CRITICAL | all | Hardcoded private keys | | 8 | MNEMONIC_PATTERN | CRITICAL | all | Hardcoded mnemonic phrases | | 9 | WALLET_DRAINING | CRITICAL | js,ts,sol | Approve + transferFrom patterns | | 10 | UNLIMITED_APPROVAL | HIGH | js,ts,sol | Unlimited token approvals | | 11 | DANGEROUS_SELFDESTRUCT | HIGH | sol | selfdestruct in contracts | | 12 | HIDDEN_TRANSFER | MEDIUM | sol | Non-standard transfer implementations | | 13 | PROXY_UPGRADE | MEDIUM | sol,js,ts | Proxy upgrade patterns | | 14 | FLASH_LOAN_RISK | MEDIUM | sol,js,ts | Flash loan usage | | 15 | REENTRANCY_PATTERN | HIGH | sol | External call before state change | | 16 | SIGNATURE_REPLAY | HIGH | sol | ecrecover without nonce | | 17 | OBFUSCATION | HIGH | js,ts,mjs,py,md | Code obfuscation techniques | | 18 | PROMPT_INJECTION | CRITICAL | all | Prompt injection attempts | | 19 | NET_EXFIL_UNRESTRICTED | HIGH | js,ts,mjs,py,md | Unrestricted POST / upload | | 20 | WEBHOOK_EXFIL | CRITICAL | all | Webhook exfiltration domains | | 21 | TROJAN_DISTRIBUTION | CRITICAL | md | Trojanized binary download + password + execute | | 22 | SUSPICIOUS_PASTE_URL | HIGH | all | URLs to paste sites (pastebin, glot.io, etc.) | | 23 | SUSPICIOUS_IP | MEDIUM | all | Hardcoded public IPv4 addresses | | 24 | SOCIAL_ENGINEERING | MEDIUM | md | Pressure language + execution instructions | ### Risk Level Calculation - Any **CRITICAL** finding -> Overall **CRITICAL** - Else any **HIGH** finding -> Overall **HIGH** - Else any **MEDIUM** finding -> Overall **MEDIUM** - Else -> **LOW** ### Output Format ``` ## GoPlus AgentGuard Security Scan Report **Target**: **Risk Level**: CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW **Files Scanned**: **Total Findings**: ### Findings | # | Risk Tag | Severity | File:Line | Evidence | |---|----------|----------|-----------|----------| | 1 | TAG_NAME | critical | path/file.ts:42 | `matched content` | ### Summary ``` ### Post-Scan Trust Registration After outputting the scan report, if the scanned target appears to be a skill (contains a `SKILL.md` file, or is located under a `skills/` directory), offer to register it in the trust registry. **Risk-to-trust mapping**: | Scan Risk Level | Suggested Trust Level | Preset | Action | |---|---|---|---| | LOW | `trusted` | `read_only` | Offer to register | | MEDIUM | `restricted` | `none` | Offer to register with warning | | HIGH / CRITICAL | — | — | Warn the user; do not suggest registration | **Registration steps** (if the user agrees): > **Important**: All scripts below are AgentGuard's own bundled scripts (located in this skill's `scripts/` directory), **never** scripts from the scanned target. Do not execute any code from the scanned repository. 1. **Ask the user for explicit confirmation** before proceeding. Show the exact command that will be executed and wait for approval. 2. Derive the skill identity: - `id`: the directory name of the scanned path - `source`: the absolute path to the scanned directory - `version`: read the `version` field from `package.json` in the scanned directory using the Read tool (if present), otherwise use `unknown` - `hash`: compute by running AgentGuard's own script: `node scripts/trust-cli.ts hash --path ` and extracting the `hash` field from the JSON output 3. Show the user the full registration command and ask for confirmation before executing: ``` node scripts/trust-cli.ts attest --id --source --version --hash --trust-level --preset --reviewed-by agentguard-scan --notes "Auto-registered after scan. Risk level: ." --force ``` 4. Only execute after user approval. Show the registration result. If scripts are not available (e.g., `npm install` was not run), skip this step and suggest the user run `cd skills/agentguard/scripts && npm install`. --- ## Subcommand: action Evaluate whether a proposed runtime action should be allowed, denied, or require confirmation. For detailed policies and detector rules, see [action-policies.md](action-policies.md). ### Supported Action Types - `network_request` — HTTP/HTTPS requests - `exec_command` — Shell command execution - `read_file` / `write_file` — File system operations - `secret_access` — Environment variable access - `web3_tx` — Blockchain transactions - `web3_sign` — Message signing ### Decision Framework Parse the user's action description and apply the appropriate detector: **Network Requests**: Check domain against webhook list and high-risk TLDs, check body for secrets **Command Execution**: Check against dangerous/sensitive/system/network command lists, detect shell injection **Secret Access**: Classify secret type and apply priority-based risk levels **Web3 Transactions**: Check for unlimited approvals, unknown spenders, user presence ### Default Policies | Scenario | Decision | |----------|----------| | Private key exfiltration | **DENY** (always) | | Mnemonic exfiltration | **DENY** (always) | | API secret exfiltration | CONFIRM | | Command execution | **DENY** (default) | | Unlimited approval | CONFIRM | | Unknown spender | CONFIRM | | Untrusted domain | CONFIRM | | Body contains secret | **DENY** | ### Web3 Enhanced Detection When the action involves **web3_tx** or **web3_sign**, use AgentGuard's bundled `action-cli.ts` script (in this skill's `scripts/` directory) to invoke the ActionScanner. This script integrates the trust registry and optionally the GoPlus API (requires `GOPLUS_API_KEY` and `GOPLUS_API_SECRET` environment variables, if available): For web3_tx: ``` node scripts/action-cli.ts decide --type web3_tx --chain-id --from --to --value [--data ] [--origin ] [--user-present] ``` For web3_sign: ``` node scripts/action-cli.ts decide --type web3_sign --chain-id --signer [--message ] [--typed-data ] [--origin ] [--user-present] ``` For standalone transaction simulation: ``` node scripts/action-cli.ts simulate --chain-id --from --to --value [--data ] [--origin ] ``` The `decide` command also works for non-Web3 actions (exec_command, network_request, etc.) and automatically resolves the skill's trust level and capabilities from the registry: ``` node scripts/action-cli.ts decide --type exec_command --command "" [--skill-source ] [--skill-id ] ``` Parse the JSON output and incorporate findings into your evaluation: - If `decision` is `deny` → override to **DENY** with the returned evidence - If `goplus.address_risk.is_malicious` → **DENY** (critical) - If `goplus.simulation.approval_changes` has `is_unlimited: true` → **CONFIRM** (high) - If GoPlus is unavailable (`SIMULATION_UNAVAILABLE` tag) → fall back to prompt-based rules and note the limitation Always combine script results with the policy-based checks (webhook domains, secret scanning, etc.) — the script enhances but does not replace rule-based evaluation. ### Output Format ``` ## GoPlus AgentGuard Action Evaluation **Action**: **Decision**: ALLOW | DENY | CONFIRM **Risk Level**: low | medium | high | critical **Risk Tags**: [TAG1, TAG2, ...] ### Evidence - ### Recommendation ``` --- ## Subcommand: patrol **OpenClaw-specific daily security patrol.** Runs 8 automated checks that leverage AgentGuard's scan engine, trust registry, and audit log to assess the security posture of an OpenClaw deployment. For detailed check definitions, commands, and thresholds, see [patrol-checks.md](patrol-checks.md). ### Sub-subcommands - **`patrol`** or **`patrol run`** — Execute all 8 checks and output a patrol report - **`patrol setup`** — Configure as an OpenClaw daily cron job - **`patrol status`** — Show last patrol results and cron schedule ### Pre-flight: OpenClaw Detection Before running any checks, verify the OpenClaw environment: 1. Check for `$OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR` env var, fall back to `~/.openclaw/` 2. Verify the directory exists and contains `openclaw.json` 3. Check if `openclaw` CLI is available in PATH If OpenClaw is not detected, output: ``` This command requires an OpenClaw environment. Detected: For non-OpenClaw environments, use /agentguard scan and /agentguard report instead. ``` Set `$OC` to the resolved OpenClaw state directory for all subsequent checks. ### The 8 Patrol Checks #### [1] Skill/Plugin Integrity Detect tampered or unregistered skill packages by comparing file hashes against the trust registry. **Steps**: 1. Discover skill directories under `$OC/skills/` (look for dirs containing `SKILL.md`) 2. For each skill, compute hash: `node scripts/trust-cli.ts hash --path ` 3. Look up the attested hash: `node scripts/trust-cli.ts lookup --source ` 4. If hash differs from attested → **INTEGRITY_DRIFT** (HIGH) 5. If skill has no trust record → **UNREGISTERED_SKILL** (MEDIUM) 6. For drifted skills, run the scan rules against the changed files to detect new threats #### [2] Secrets Exposure Scan workspace files for leaked secrets using AgentGuard's own detection patterns. **Steps**: 1. Use Grep to scan `$OC/workspace/` (especially `memory/` and `logs/`) with patterns from: - scan-rules.md Rule 7 (PRIVATE_KEY_PATTERN): `0x[a-fA-F0-9]{64}` in quotes - scan-rules.md Rule 8 (MNEMONIC_PATTERN): BIP-39 word sequences, `seed_phrase`, `mnemonic` - scan-rules.md Rule 5 (READ_SSH_KEYS): SSH key file references in workspace - action-policies.md secret patterns: AWS keys (`AKIA...`), GitHub tokens (`gh[pousr]_...`), DB connection strings 2. Scan any `.env*` files under `$OC/` for plaintext credentials 3. Check `~/.ssh/` and `~/.gnupg/` directory permissions (should be 700) #### [3] Network Exposure Detect dangerous port exposure and firewall misconfigurations. **Steps**: 1. List listening ports: `ss -tlnp` or `lsof -i -P -n | grep LISTEN` 2. Flag high-risk services on 0.0.0.0: Redis(6379), Docker API(2375), MySQL(3306), PostgreSQL(5432), MongoDB(27017) 3. Check firewall status: `ufw status` or `iptables -L INPUT -n` 4. Check outbound connections (`ss -tnp state established`) and cross-reference against action-policies.md webhook/exfil domain list and high-risk TLDs #### [4] Cron & Scheduled Tasks Audit all cron jobs for download-and-execute patterns. **Steps**: 1. List OpenClaw cron jobs: `openclaw cron list` 2. List system crontab: `crontab -l` and contents of `/etc/cron.d/` 3. List systemd timers: `systemctl list-timers --all` 4. Scan all cron command bodies using scan-rules.md Rule 2 (AUTO_UPDATE) patterns: `curl|bash`, `wget|sh`, `eval "$(curl`, `base64 -d | bash` 5. Flag unknown cron jobs that touch `$OC/` directories #### [5] File System Changes (24h) Detect suspicious file modifications in the last 24 hours. **Steps**: 1. Find recently modified files: `find $OC/ ~/.ssh/ ~/.gnupg/ /etc/cron.d/ -type f -mtime -1` 2. For modified files with scannable extensions (.js/.ts/.py/.sh/.md/.json), run the full scan rule set 3. Check permissions on critical files: - `$OC/openclaw.json` → should be 600 - `$OC/devices/paired.json` → should be 600 - `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` → should be 600 4. Detect new executable files in workspace: `find $OC/workspace/ -type f -perm +111 -mtime -1` #### [6] Audit Log Analysis (24h) Analyze AgentGuard's audit trail for attack patterns. **Steps**: 1. Read `~/.agentguard/audit.jsonl`, filter to last 24h by timestamp 2. Compute statistics: total events, deny/confirm/allow counts, group denials by `risk_tags` and `initiating_skill` 3. Flag patterns: - Same skill denied 3+ times → potential attack (HIGH) - Any event with `risk_level: critical` → (CRITICAL) - `WEBHOOK_EXFIL` or `NET_EXFIL_UNRESTRICTED` tags → (HIGH) - `PROMPT_INJECTION` tag → (CRITICAL) 4. For skills with high deny rates still not revoked: recommend `/agentguard trust revoke` #### [7] Environment & Configuration Verify security configuration is production-appropriate. **Steps**: 1. List environment variables matching sensitive names (values masked): `API_KEY`, `SECRET`, `PASSWORD`, `TOKEN`, `PRIVATE`, `CREDENTIAL` 2. Check if `GOPLUS_API_KEY`/`GOPLUS_API_SECRET` are configured (if Web3 features are in use) 3. Read `~/.agentguard/config.json` — flag `permissive` protection level in production 4. If `$OC/.config-baseline.sha256` exists, verify: `sha256sum -c $OC/.config-baseline.sha256` #### [8] Trust Registry Health Check for expired, stale, or over-privileged trust records. **Steps**: 1. List all records: `node scripts/trust-cli.ts list` 2. Flag: - Expired attestations (`expires_at` in the past) - Trusted skills not re-scanned in 30+ days - Installed skills with `untrusted` status - Over-privileged skills: `exec: allow` combined with `network_allowlist: ["*"]` 3. Output registry statistics: total records, distribution by trust level ### Patrol Report Format ``` ## GoPlus AgentGuard Patrol Report **Timestamp**: **OpenClaw Home**: <$OC path> **Protection Level**: **Overall Status**: PASS | WARN | FAIL ### Check Results | # | Check | Status | Findings | Severity | |---|-------|--------|----------|----------| | 1 | Skill/Plugin Integrity | PASS/WARN/FAIL | | | | 2 | Secrets Exposure | ... | ... | ... | | 3 | Network Exposure | ... | ... | ... | | 4 | Cron & Scheduled Tasks | ... | ... | ... | | 5 | File System Changes | ... | ... | ... | | 6 | Audit Log Analysis | ... | ... | ... | | 7 | Environment & Config | ... | ... | ... | | 8 | Trust Registry Health | ... | ... | ... | ### Findings Detail (only checks with findings are shown) #### [N] Check Name - ### Recommendations 1. [SEVERITY] ### Next Patrol ``` **Overall status**: Any CRITICAL → **FAIL**, any HIGH → **WARN**, else **PASS** After outputting the report, append a summary entry to `~/.agentguard/audit.jsonl`: ```json {"timestamp":"...","event":"patrol","overall_status":"PASS|WARN|FAIL","checks":8,"findings":,"critical":,"high":} ``` ### patrol setup Configure the patrol as an OpenClaw daily cron job. **Steps**: 1. Verify OpenClaw environment (same pre-flight as `patrol run`) 2. Ask the user for: - **Timezone** (default: UTC). Examples: `Asia/Shanghai`, `America/New_York`, `Europe/London` - **Schedule** (default: `0 3 * * *` — daily at 03:00) - **Notification channel** (optional): `telegram`, `discord`, `signal` - **Chat ID / webhook** (required if channel is set) 3. Generate the cron registration command: ```bash openclaw cron add \ --name "agentguard-patrol" \ --description "GoPlus AgentGuard daily security patrol" \ --cron "" \ --tz "" \ --session "isolated" \ --message "/agentguard patrol run" \ --timeout-seconds 300 \ --thinking off \ # Only include these if notification is configured: --announce \ --channel \ --to ``` 4. **Show the exact command to the user and wait for explicit confirmation** before executing 5. After execution, verify with `openclaw cron list` 6. Output confirmation with the cron schedule > **Note**: `--timeout-seconds 300` is required because isolated sessions need cold-start time. The default 120s is not enough. ### patrol status Show the current patrol state. **Steps**: 1. Read `~/.agentguard/audit.jsonl`, find the most recent `event: "patrol"` entry 2. If found, display: timestamp, overall status, finding counts 3. Run `openclaw cron list` and look for `agentguard-patrol` job 4. If cron is configured, show: schedule, timezone, last run time, next run time 5. If cron is not configured, suggest: `/agentguard patrol setup` --- # Trust & Configuration ## Subcommand: trust Manage skill trust levels using the GoPlus AgentGuard registry. ### Trust Levels | Level | Description | |-------|-------------| | `untrusted` | Default. Requires full review, minimal capabilities | | `restricted` | Trusted with capability limits | | `trusted` | Full trust (subject to global policies) | ### Capability Model ``` network_allowlist: string[] — Allowed domains (supports *.example.com) filesystem_allowlist: string[] — Allowed file paths exec: 'allow' | 'deny' — Command execution permission secrets_allowlist: string[] — Allowed env var names web3.chains_allowlist: number[] — Allowed chain IDs web3.rpc_allowlist: string[] — Allowed RPC endpoints web3.tx_policy: 'allow' | 'confirm_high_risk' | 'deny' ``` ### Presets | Preset | Description | |--------|-------------| | `none` | All deny, empty allowlists | | `read_only` | Local filesystem read-only | | `trading_bot` | Exchange APIs (Binance, Bybit, OKX, Coinbase), Web3 chains 1/56/137/42161 | | `defi` | All network, multi-chain DeFi (1/56/137/42161/10/8453/43114), no exec | ### Operations **lookup** — `agentguard trust lookup --source --version ` Query the registry for a skill's trust record. **attest** — `agentguard trust attest --id --source --version --hash --trust-level --preset --reviewed-by ` Create or update a trust record. Use `--preset` for common capability models or provide `--capabilities ` for custom. **revoke** — `agentguard trust revoke --source --reason ` Revoke trust for a skill. Supports `--source-pattern` for wildcards. **list** — `agentguard trust list [--trust-level ] [--status ]` List all trust records with optional filters. ### Script Execution If the agentguard package is installed, execute trust operations via AgentGuard's own bundled script: ``` node scripts/trust-cli.ts [args] ``` For operations that modify the trust registry (`attest`, `revoke`), always show the user the exact command and ask for explicit confirmation before executing. If scripts are not available, help the user inspect `data/registry.json` directly using Read tool. --- ## Subcommand: config Set the GoPlus AgentGuard protection level. ### Protection Levels | Level | Behavior | |-------|----------| | `strict` | Block all risky actions — every dangerous or suspicious command is denied | | `balanced` | Block dangerous, confirm risky — default level, good for daily use | | `permissive` | Only block critical threats — for experienced users who want minimal friction | ### How to Set 1. Read `$ARGUMENTS` to get the desired level 2. Write the config to `~/.agentguard/config.json`: ```json {"level": "balanced"} ``` 3. Confirm the change to the user If no level is specified, read and display the current config. --- # Reporting ## Subcommand: report Display recent security events from the GoPlus AgentGuard audit log. ### Log Location The audit log is stored at `~/.agentguard/audit.jsonl`. Each line is a JSON object with: ```json {"timestamp":"...","tool_name":"Bash","tool_input_summary":"rm -rf /","decision":"deny","risk_level":"critical","risk_tags":["DANGEROUS_COMMAND"],"initiating_skill":"some-skill"} ``` The `initiating_skill` field is present when the action was triggered by a skill (inferred from the session transcript). When absent, the action came from the user directly. ### How to Display 1. Read `~/.agentguard/audit.jsonl` using the Read tool 2. Parse each line as JSON 3. Format as a table showing recent events (last 50 by default) 4. If any events have `initiating_skill`, add a "Skill Activity" section grouping events by skill ### Output Format ``` ## GoPlus AgentGuard Security Report **Events**: **Blocked**: **Confirmed**: ### Recent Events | Time | Tool | Action | Decision | Risk | Tags | Skill | |------|------|--------|----------|------|------|-------| | 2025-01-15 14:30 | Bash | rm -rf / | DENY | critical | DANGEROUS_COMMAND | some-skill | | 2025-01-15 14:28 | Write | .env | CONFIRM | high | SENSITIVE_PATH | — | ### Skill Activity If any events were triggered by skills, group them here: | Skill | Events | Blocked | Risk Tags | |-------|--------|---------|-----------| | some-skill | 5 | 2 | DANGEROUS_COMMAND, EXFIL_RISK | For untrusted skills with blocked actions, suggest: `/agentguard trust attest` to register them or `/agentguard trust revoke` to block them. ### Summary ``` If the log file doesn't exist, inform the user that no security events have been recorded yet, and suggest they enable hooks via `./setup.sh` or by adding the plugin. --- # Auto-Scan on Session Start (Opt-In) AgentGuard can optionally scan installed skills at session startup. **This is disabled by default** and must be explicitly enabled: - **Claude Code**: Set environment variable `AGENTGUARD_AUTO_SCAN=1` - **OpenClaw**: Pass `{ skipAutoScan: false }` when registering the plugin When enabled, auto-scan operates in **report-only mode**: 1. Discovers skill directories (containing `SKILL.md`) under `~/.claude/skills/` and `~/.openclaw/skills/` 2. Runs `quickScan()` on each skill 3. Reports results to stderr (skill name + risk level + risk tags) Auto-scan **does NOT**: - Modify the trust registry (no `forceAttest` calls) - Write code snippets or evidence details to disk - Execute any code from the scanned skills The audit log (`~/.agentguard/audit.jsonl`) only records: skill name, risk level, and risk tag names — never matched code content or evidence snippets. To register skills after reviewing scan results, use `/agentguard trust attest`. --- Source attribution: LeoYeAI Original project: https://github.com/LeoYeAI/openclaw-master-skills/blob/e5199b56ae1ff72e141586c17695563486c46702/skills/goplus-agentguard/SKILL.md License: MIT License information: https://opensource.org/license/mit Original upstream instructions; downloaded from Mega AI Hub. ## Upstream license notice MIT License Copyright (c) 2026 MyClaw.ai (LeoYeAI) Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. # Mega AI Hub resource metadata Creator / publisher: LeoYeAI Original project: https://github.com/LeoYeAI/openclaw-master-skills/blob/e5199b56ae1ff72e141586c17695563486c46702/skills/goplus-agentguard/SKILL.md Attribution basis: Source repository record Fields of work: Development & Engineering Roles: Backend Developer, DevOps / SRE, Security Engineer Specialties: API, Backend Tools: Goplus Api, Node.Js Country applicability: Country not specified Classification basis: Source catalog labels Instruction SHA-256: bf764af3f1aaaa224617df25f4badccb1a961ed7189c2e6f7c2e1eec1c9f4758