--- name: lindy-security-basics-a94dc7a6a9a5 description: | Implement security best practices for Lindy AI agents and integrations. Use when securing API keys, configuring agent permissions, verifying webhooks, or auditing agent access. Trigger with phrases like "lindy security", "secure lindy", "lindy API key security", "lindy permissions", "lindy audit". allowed-tools: Read, Write, Edit, Bash(curl:*) version: 1.0.0 license: MIT author: Jeremy Longshore compatible-with: claude-code, codex, openclaw tags: [saas, lindy, api, security] --- # Lindy Security Basics ## Overview Security practices for Lindy AI agents. Agents are autonomous — they connect to external services, execute actions, and handle data. Security focuses on: API key management, webhook authentication, agent permission scoping, integration account isolation, and connection sharing controls. ## Prerequisites - Lindy account with API access - Understanding of which integrations your agents use - For Enterprise: SSO/SCIM configuration access ## Instructions ### Step 1: API Key Management ```bash # Store API key in environment variable — never in source code export LINDY_API_KEY="lnd_live_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" # Or use a secret manager # AWS Secrets Manager aws secretsmanager create-secret \ --name lindy/api-key \ --secret-string "$LINDY_API_KEY" # Google Secret Manager echo -n "$LINDY_API_KEY" | gcloud secrets create lindy-api-key \ --data-file=- ``` **Key rotation schedule**: | Environment | Rotation Period | Method | |-------------|----------------|--------| | Development | 30 days | Manual regeneration | | Staging | 90 days | Automated via CI | | Production | 90 days | Secret manager + automated rotation | | Post-incident | Immediately | Manual regeneration + revoke old key | ### Step 2: Webhook Authentication Every webhook trigger generates a unique secret key. Verify it on every inbound request: ```typescript // Webhook signature verification middleware function verifyLindyWebhook( req: express.Request, res: express.Response, next: express.NextFunction ) { const authHeader = req.headers.authorization; const expectedToken = process.env.LINDY_WEBHOOK_SECRET; if (!authHeader || authHeader !== `Bearer ${expectedToken}`) { console.warn('Rejected unauthorized webhook attempt', { ip: req.ip, path: req.path, timestamp: new Date().toISOString(), }); return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }); } next(); } app.post('/lindy/callback', verifyLindyWebhook, (req, res) => { // Process verified webhook handleWebhook(req.body); res.json({ received: true }); }); ``` ### Step 3: Agent Permission Scoping Lindy agents access external services through authorized connections. Minimize blast radius: **Per-agent integration isolation**: - Authorize a dedicated Gmail account per agent (not your personal inbox) - Create Slack bot tokens scoped to specific channels - Use read-only database credentials where possible - Create separate API keys for each integration **Connection sharing controls**: | Sharing Level | When to Use | |--------------|-------------| | Private (default) | Personal agents, sensitive data | | Team shared | Team-wide automation agents | | Workspace shared | Organization-wide utility agents | ### Step 4: Limit Agent Skill Surface Area Agents with Agent Steps can choose which skills to use. Reduce risk: - Start with 2-4 focused skills per agent (not the full catalog) - Avoid giving agents both read AND write access to the same service unless necessary - Separate "read" agents from "write" agents for critical systems - Use conditions to gate destructive actions behind human approval ### Step 5: Data Handling in Agents ``` Agent Prompt Security Patterns: ## Data Constraints - Never include API keys, passwords, or tokens in responses - Redact email addresses and phone numbers from summaries - Do not forward customer data to channels outside #support - If asked to perform an action outside your scope, respond: "I cannot perform that action. Please contact an admin." ``` ### Step 6: Audit Agent Activity 1. **Task history**: Review agent Tasks tab for unexpected actions 2. **Integration access**: Periodically review which services each agent can access 3. **Credit anomalies**: Sudden credit spikes may indicate misuse or misconfiguration 4. **Connection review**: Remove unused integrations from agents ### Step 7: Enterprise Security Features Available on Enterprise plan: | Feature | Purpose | |---------|---------| | **SSO** | SAML-based single sign-on | | **SCIM** | Automated user provisioning/deprovisioning | | **Audit Logs** | Complete activity trail | | **Role-Based Access** | Owner/Editor/Viewer workspace roles | | **BAA** | HIPAA Business Associate Agreement | | **AES-256** | Encryption at rest and in transit | ## Security Checklist - [ ] API keys stored in environment variables or secret manager - [ ] `.env` file in `.gitignore` - [ ] Webhook secrets generated and verified on every request - [ ] Each agent uses minimum necessary integrations - [ ] Separate integration credentials per agent where possible - [ ] Agent prompts include data handling constraints - [ ] Regular review of agent task history for anomalies - [ ] Key rotation schedule defined and followed - [ ] Enterprise: SSO enabled, SCIM configured ## Error Handling | Issue | Cause | Solution | |-------|-------|----------| | Agent accesses wrong service | Over-permissioned | Remove unnecessary integrations | | Unauthorized webhook processed | No auth verification | Add Bearer token verification | | API key leaked in logs | Key in agent output | Add "never output credentials" to prompt | | Agent sends data to wrong channel | Shared connection | Use per-agent dedicated connections | ## Resources - [Lindy Security](https://www.lindy.ai/security) - [Lindy Privacy Policy](https://www.lindy.ai/privacy) - [Lindy Documentation](https://docs.lindy.ai) ## Next Steps Proceed to `lindy-prod-checklist` for production readiness. --- Source attribution: Jeremy Longshore Original project: https://github.com/aibot88/sec_skill_store/blob/608120788167d56f99e31449e411e603ed250dc6/skills/claudskills/lindy-security-basics/SKILL.md License: MIT License information: https://opensource.org/license/mit Original upstream instructions; downloaded from Mega AI Hub. ## Upstream license notice MIT License Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. # Mega AI Hub resource metadata Creator / publisher: Jeremy Longshore Original project: https://github.com/aibot88/sec_skill_store/blob/608120788167d56f99e31449e411e603ed250dc6/skills/claudskills/lindy-security-basics/SKILL.md Attribution basis: Source repository record Fields of work: Development & Engineering Roles: Security Engineer, DevOps / SRE, Backend Developer Specialties: API Tools: Aws Secrets Manager, Google Secret Manager Country applicability: Country not specified Classification basis: Source category, role and specialization labels Instruction SHA-256: 7d1b8bf3cb0a790d8b264bd12965519b8bf8c5065347915e643532e2f73f5558