--- name: pentest-threat-model-383efe21eedb description: Threat modeling — STRIDE, DREAD, attack tree, data flow diagram, MITRE ATT&CK Navigator integration. Triggers on threat model, STRIDE, DREAD, attack tree, DFD, data flow diagram, MITRE ATT&CK, threat matrix, risk scoring. license: MIT compatibility: Works with Claude Code allowed-tools: Read Write Edit Grep metadata: author: badi badi-version: ">=1.24.0" category: pentest scope: advisory inspired-by: 0xSteph/pentest-ai-agents threat-modeler --- # pentest-threat-model System threat modeling — STRIDE, DREAD, attack tree, DFD. Engagement basinda veya design review'da kullanilir. ## Triggers - "threat model olustur" - "STRIDE analizi" - "DREAD scoring" - "attack tree ciz" - "data flow diagram" - "MITRE ATT&CK matrix" ## STRIDE (Microsoft) | Harf | Tehdit | Karsiti Property | |------|--------|------------------| | S | Spoofing identity | Authentication | | T | Tampering with data | Integrity | | R | Repudiation | Non-repudiation | | I | Information disclosure | Confidentiality | | D | Denial of service | Availability | | E | Elevation of privilege | Authorization | Her DFD elementine (Process, Data Store, Data Flow, Trust Boundary) STRIDE uygula. ## DREAD Scoring | Boyut | 1 (Dusuk) | 5 (Yuksek) | 10 (Kritik) | |-------|-----------|------------|-------------| | Damage | Minimal | Major | Catastrophic | | Reproducibility | Hard | Sometimes | Trivial | | Exploitability | Hard | Moderate | Trivial (script) | | Affected users | Few | Many | Most | | Discoverability | Hidden | Apparent | Public docs | Toplam: 50 max. Yuksek = high risk. ## DFD Yapisi ``` [External Entity] --> ((Process)) --> [Data Store] | Trust Boundary | ((Internal Service)) ``` Komponentler: - **External Entity** (kare): user, 3rd party API - **Process** (daire): web server, microservice - **Data Store** (silindir): database, cache - **Data Flow** (ok): istek/yanit - **Trust Boundary** (kesikli cizgi): VPC sinir, network zone ## Attack Tree Sablonu ``` Hedef: Steal credit card data ├── 1. Compromise web server │ ├── 1.1 RCE via SQL injection │ │ └── 1.1.1 Find SQLi in /api │ ├── 1.2 Steal session cookie via XSS │ └── 1.3 Brute force admin panel ├── 2. Compromise database directly │ ├── 2.1 Internal port reachable │ └── 2.2 Default credential └── 3. Social engineer admin ├── 3.1 Phishing └── 3.2 Vishing IT helpdesk ``` Her leaf'e: - DREAD score - Likelihood (1-5) - Cost to exploit (saat/gun) - Detection (likely/possible/unlikely) ## MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Mapping ```yaml threat_model: asset: Production database threats: - id: T-DB-001 stride: I (Information disclosure) attack: tactic: TA0009 Collection technique: T1213 Data from Information Repositories dread: { damage: 9, repro: 7, exploit: 6, affected: 8, discover: 5 } score: 35 mitigation: - DB encryption at rest - Access logging + SIEM rule - Network segmentation ``` ## Output Sablonu ```markdown ## Threat Model — ### System Description - Frontend: React SPA on CDN - Backend: Node.js API on Kubernetes - Data: PostgreSQL (managed) + Redis (managed) - 3rd party: Stripe, SendGrid, Auth0 ### Trust Boundaries 1. CDN <-> API (TLS, JWT auth) 2. API <-> DB (VPC private subnet, IAM auth) 3. API <-> 3rd party (TLS + API key) ### Top 5 Threats (DREAD score) | # | Threat | STRIDE | DREAD | Tactic | |---|--------|--------|-------|--------| | 1 | Stripe webhook spoofing (no sig verify) | T | 38 | Initial Access | | 2 | JWT alg=none bypass | S+E | 36 | Initial Access | | 3 | DB credential leak via 0/1-day | I | 33 | Credential Access | | 4 | Redis SSRF via SSRF in URL param | I | 30 | Discovery | | 5 | DoS via excessive GraphQL nesting | D | 28 | Impact | ### Mitigations - Stripe: webhook signature verify (Stripe-Signature header) - JWT: enforce alg whitelist (RS256 only) - DB: rotate credentials quarterly, IAM auth (no static creds) - SSRF: URL allowlist (no internal IP) - GraphQL: max-depth 7, max-aliases 30 ``` ## Mermaid DFD Render ```mermaid flowchart LR User[User Browser] -->|HTTPS| CDN[CDN] CDN -->|HTTPS+JWT| API[API Gateway] API -->|VPC| DB[(PostgreSQL)] API -->|VPC| Cache[(Redis)] API -->|HTTPS+API Key| Stripe[Stripe API] API -->|HTTPS+API Key| SendGrid[SendGrid] classDef boundary stroke-dasharray:5 style CDN stroke-dasharray:5 style API stroke-dasharray:5 ``` ## Out-of-Scope - Live attack execution (sadece modelleme) - Existing model'i otomatik update (gerektikce manuel review) --- Source attribution: badi Original project: https://github.com/aibot88/sec_skill_store/blob/608120788167d56f99e31449e411e603ed250dc6/skills/claudskills/pentest-threat-model/SKILL.md License: MIT License information: https://opensource.org/license/mit Original upstream instructions; downloaded from Mega AI Hub. ## Upstream license notice MIT License Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. # Mega AI Hub resource metadata Creator / publisher: badi Original project: https://github.com/aibot88/sec_skill_store/blob/608120788167d56f99e31449e411e603ed250dc6/skills/claudskills/pentest-threat-model/SKILL.md Attribution basis: Source repository record Fields of work: Development & Engineering, Data & Analytics, Product Management Roles: Security Engineer, Data Analyst, Backend Developer, DevOps / SRE, Product Manager Specialties: API, Backend Tools: Mitre Att&Ck Navigator Country applicability: Country not specified Classification basis: Source category, role and specialization labels Instruction SHA-256: cae94614f5ca54ede41e86832f0d72dfec642c0953bba0cfdd03ef63a33dbf77