5,546,132 AI resources indexedWorking toward the world’s largest AI resource index.

PDF

A Safety Report on GPT-5.2, Gemini 3 Pro, Qwen3-VL, Doubao 1.8, Grok 4.1 Fast, Nano Banana Pro, and Seedream 4.5

Research paper by Xingjun Ma and collaborators. Published 2026-01-15. Topics: Large Language Models, Multimodal Large Language Models, safety evaluation, adversarial evaluation, multilingual evaluation.

Resource information

Authors
Xingjun Ma, Yixu Wang, Hengyuan Xu, Yutao Wu, Yifan Ding, Yunhan Zhao, Zilong Wang, Jiabin Hua, Ming Wen, Jianan Liu, Ranjie Duan, Yifeng Gao, Yingshui Tan, Yunhao Chen, Hui Xue, Xin Wang, Wei Cheng, Jingjing Chen, Zuxuan Wu, Bo Li, Yu-Gang Jiang
Research area
Artificial intelligence
Application domain
General AI research
AI methods
Large language models
Research topics
cs.AI, cs.CL, cs.CV, cs.LG
arXiv record date
2026-01-16
Publication date
2026-01-15
Publication
arXiv
Upstream last modified
Jan 19, 2026
Last record update
Nov 3, 2026

Abstract

The rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) has driven major gains in reasoning, perception, and generation across language and vision, yet whether these advances translate into comparable improvements in safety remains unclear, partly due to fragmented evaluations that focus on isolated modalities or threat models. In this report, we present an integrated safety evaluation of six frontier models--GPT-5.2, Gemini 3 Pro, Qwen3-VL, Grok 4.1 Fast, Nano Banana Pro, and Seedream 4.5--assessing each across language, vision-language, and image generation using a unified protocol that combines benchmark, adversarial, multilingual, and compliance evaluations. By aggregating results into safety leaderboards and model profiles, we reveal a highly uneven safety landscape: while GPT-5.2 demonstrates consistently strong and balanced performance, other models exhibit clear trade-offs across benchmark safety, adversarial robustness, multilingual generalization, and regulatory compliance. Despite strong results under standard benchmarks, all models remain highly vulnerable under adversarial testing, with worst-case safety rates dropping below 6%. Text-to-image models show slightly stronger alignment in regulated visual risk categories, yet remain fragile when faced with adversarial or semantically ambiguous prompts. Overall, these findings highlight that safety in frontier models is inherently multidimensional--shaped by modality, language, and evaluation design--underscoring the need for standardized, holistic safety assessments to better reflect real-world risk and guide responsible deployment.