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Detect WMI-based lateral movement by analyzing Windows Event ID 4688
--- name: hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi-afb57eb7f4aa description: Detects WMI-based lateral movement (e.g. wmic process call create, Win32_Process.Create()) by analyzing Windows Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event ID 1 for WmiPrvSE.exe spawning suspicious child processes like cmd.exe or powershell.exe, plus WMI-Activity/Operational events 5857/5860/5861 for subscription-based persistence. Use when hunting for remote code execution via WMI or investigating lateral movement across Windows hosts. domain: cybersecurity subdomain: threat-hunting tags: - threat-hunting - lateral-movement - wmi - sysmon - mitre-attack - process-creation version: '1.0' author: mahipal license: Apache-2.0 nist_csf: - DE.CM-01 - DE.AE-02 - DE.AE-07 - ID.RA-05 mitre_attack: - T1046 - T1057 - T1082 - T1083 - T1021 --- # Hunting for Lateral Movement via WMI ## Overview Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is commonly abused for lateral movement via `wmic process call create` or Win32_Process.Create() to execute commands on remote hosts. Detection focuses on identifying WmiPrvSE.exe spawning child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) in Windows Security Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event ID 1 logs, along with WMI-Activity/Operational events (5857, 5860, 5861) for event subscription persistence. ## When to Use - When investigating security incidents that require hunting for lateral movement via wmi - When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain - When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type - When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques ## Prerequisites - Windows Security Event Logs with Process Creation auditing enabled (Event 4688 with command line) - Sysmon installed with Event ID 1 (Process Creation) configured - Python 3.9+ with `python-evtx`, `lxml` libraries - Understanding of WMI architecture and WmiPrvSE.exe behavior ## Steps ### Step 1: Parse Process Creation Events Extract Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event 1 entries from EVTX files. ### Step 2: Detect WmiPrvSE Child Processes Flag processes where ParentImage/ParentProcessName is WmiPrvSE.exe, indicating remote WMI execution. ### Step 3: Analyze Command Line Patterns Identify suspicious command lines matching WMI lateral movement patterns (cmd.exe /q /c, output redirection to admin$ share). ### Step 4: Check WMI Event Subscriptions Parse WMI-Activity/Operational log for event consumer creation indicating persistence. ## Expected Output JSON report with WMI-spawned processes, suspicious command lines, WMI event subscription alerts, and timeline of lateral movement activity.--- name: hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi-afb57eb7f4aa description: Detects WMI-based lateral movement (e.g. wmic process call create, Win32_Process.Create()) by analyzing Windows Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event ID 1 for WmiPrvSE.exe spawning suspicious child processes like cmd.exe or powershell.exe, plus WMI-Activity/Operational events 5857/5860/5861 for subscription-based persistence. Use when hunting for remote code execution via WMI or investigating lateral movement across Windows hosts. domain: cybersecurity subdomain: threat-hunting tags: - threat-hunting - lateral-movement - wmi - sysmon - mitre-attack - process-creation version: '1.0' author: mahipal license: Apache-2.0 nist_csf: - DE.CM-01 - DE.AE-02 - DE.AE-07 - ID.RA-05 mitre_attack: - T1046 - T1057 - T1082 - T1083 - T1021 --- # Hunting for Lateral Movement via WMI ## Overview Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is commonly abused for lateral movement via `wmic process call create` or Win32_Process.Create() to execute commands on remote hosts. Detection focuses on identifying WmiPrvSE.exe spawning child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) in Windows Security Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event ID 1 logs, along with WMI-Activity/Operational events (5857, 5860, 5861) for event subscription persistence. ## When to Use - When investigating security incidents that require hunting for lateral movement via wmi - When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain - When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type - When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques ## Prerequisites - Windows Security Event Logs with Process Creation auditing enabled (Event 4688 with command line) - Sysmon installed with Event ID 1 (Process Creation) configured - Python 3.9+ with `python-evtx`, `lxml` libraries - Understanding of WMI architecture and WmiPrvSE.exe behavior ## Steps ### Step 1: Parse Process Creation Events Extract Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event 1 entries from EVTX files. ### Step 2: Detect WmiPrvSE Child Processes Flag processes where ParentImage/ParentProcessName is WmiPrvSE.exe, indicating remote WMI execution. ### Step 3: Analyze Command Line Patterns Identify suspicious command lines matching WMI lateral movement patterns (cmd.exe /q /c, output redirection to admin$ share). ### Step 4: Check WMI Event Subscriptions Parse WMI-Activity/Operational log for event consumer creation indicating persistence. ## Expected Output JSON report with WMI-spawned processes, suspicious command lines, WMI event subscription alerts, and timeline of lateral movement activity.
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