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LLM Red Team Skill Catalog — AATMF v3

LLM red team category — full AATMF v3 tactic coverage (T01–T15). Routing skill: read this first to identify which tactic applies, then load the matching sub-skill. Maps to MITRE ATLAS where overlap exists.

Installable skillApache-2.0By PurpleAILABUpdated Oct 30, 2026
INTENDED FOROpenClawInstall in a listed agent.

instructions.md

---
name: llm-redteam-overview-ee8a3e1ff39a
description: "LLM red team category — full AATMF v3 tactic coverage (T01–T15). Routing skill: read this first to identify which tactic applies, then load the matching sub-skill. Maps to MITRE ATLAS where overlap exists."
allowed-tools: Bash Read Write
metadata:
  subdomain: ai-security
  when_to_use: "llm, ai, model, gpt, claude, prompt, jailbreak, ai red team, prompt injection, llm exploit, aatmf, atlas, agentic, rag, multimodal, training data, model poisoning, output filter bypass"
  tags: ai-security, llm, aatmf, atlas
  mitre_attack: T1606
  aatmf_framework: v3
---

# LLM Red Team Skill Catalog — AATMF v3

This is the **routing skill** for AI/LLM red-team work. The 15 sub-skills below cover every tactic in the AI/ML Adversarial Tactics, Techniques & Mitigations Framework (AATMF v3). Load the specific sub-skill that matches the attacker objective.

## Tactic Map

| Tactic | Sub-Skill | Covers | Load Path |
|---|---|---|---|
| T01 | **prompt-injection** | Direct + indirect prompt injection, ASCII smuggling, payload-in-image, prompt leaking | `load_skill("/skills/plugins/llm-redteam/t01-prompt-injection/SKILL.md")` |
| T02 | **linguistic-evasion** | Translation/transliteration bypass, base64/leetspeak/emoji encoding, low-resource-language jailbreak, multi-lingual context split | `load_skill("/skills/plugins/llm-redteam/t02-linguistic-evasion/SKILL.md")` |
| T03 | **reasoning-exploit** | CoT / ReAct hijack, math/logic distractor, role-play escalation, hypothetical / counterfactual framing | `load_skill("/skills/plugins/llm-redteam/t03-reasoning-exploit/SKILL.md")` |
| T04 | **memory-manipulation** | Long-context overflow, conversation rewrite, sliding-window poisoning, "previous turn" forgery | `load_skill("/skills/plugins/llm-redteam/t04-memory-manipulation/SKILL.md")` |
| T05 | **api-exploitation** | Function-calling abuse, tool-schema confusion, parameter pollution, response-format coercion | `load_skill("/skills/plugins/llm-redteam/t05-api-exploitation/SKILL.md")` |
| T06 | **training-poisoning** | Backdoor trigger injection, label flip, RLHF reward hacking, fine-tune dataset contamination | `load_skill("/skills/plugins/llm-redteam/t06-training-poisoning/SKILL.md")` |
| T07 | **output-exfil** | Data-leak via reflection, side-channel via length/timing, watermark stripping, token-by-token exfil | `load_skill("/skills/plugins/llm-redteam/t07-output-exfil/SKILL.md")` |
| T08 | **deception** | Confident-hallucination weaponization, persona impersonation, source spoofing, "as the system says" framings | `load_skill("/skills/plugins/llm-redteam/t08-deception/SKILL.md")` |
| T09 | **multimodal** | Image/audio prompt injection, OCR-payload, steganographic prompts, adversarial perturbations | `load_skill("/skills/plugins/llm-redteam/t09-multimodal/SKILL.md")` |
| T10 | **confidentiality-breach** | System-prompt extraction, weight inference, training-data extraction, PII echo | `load_skill("/skills/plugins/llm-redteam/t10-confidentiality-breach/SKILL.md")` |
| T11 | **agentic-exploit** | Tool-chain hijack, autonomous-loop poisoning, plan-injection, sub-agent confusion | `load_skill("/skills/plugins/llm-redteam/t11-agentic-exploit/SKILL.md")` |
| T12 | **rag-poisoning** | RAG index injection, document smuggling, embedding-collision, retrieval-rank gaming | `load_skill("/skills/plugins/llm-redteam/t12-rag-poisoning/SKILL.md")` |
| T13 | **supply-chain** | Model registry tampering, dependency confusion (HF Hub, Ollama, MCP), serialization payload abuse | `load_skill("/skills/plugins/llm-redteam/t13-supply-chain/SKILL.md")` |
| T14 | **infra-warfare** | GPU resource abuse, billing-amplification, rate-limit DoS, cold-start abuse, region failover poisoning | `load_skill("/skills/plugins/llm-redteam/t14-infra-warfare/SKILL.md")` |
| T15 | **human-ai-coupling** | Operator manipulation via AI output, social engineering uplift, dark-pattern UX exploiting AI trust | `load_skill("/skills/plugins/llm-redteam/t15-human-ai-coupling/SKILL.md")` |

## Quick Routing

```
Target type identified?
├── Chat-only LLM endpoint     → T01, T02, T03, T10
├── LLM with tools / function calling → T05, T11
├── LLM with RAG / retrieval     → T12, T01 (indirect)
├── LLM with multimodal input    → T09
├── Fine-tuned / custom model    → T06, T10 (extraction)
├── Cross-tenant / shared infra  → T14, T13
└── Human-in-the-loop product    → T15, T08
```

## Tooling

| Tool | Use |
|---|---|
| `promptfoo` | Plugin-based red-team eval — declarative test cases, runs all 15 tactic plugins |
| `garak` | NVIDIA's LLM vulnerability scanner — alignment, jailbreak, leak probes |
| `pyrit` | Microsoft's open red-team automation framework |
| `agentdojo` | Agentic-system specific (T11) — sandboxed tool-chain attack benchmark |
| `LangSmith / Langfuse` | Observation surface — replay attacks against deployed agents |

## Cross-Reference

- **MITRE ATLAS** — covers tactic-level coverage (Reconnaissance → Impact). AATMF is more attacker-procedure focused. Most AATMF techniques map to one or more ATLAS techniques; the sub-skills note the mapping in their frontmatter.
- **OWASP LLM Top 10** — risk-class level. AATMF tactics map across LLM01-LLM10.
- **NIST AI RMF AI 600-1** — governance lens; AATMF gives the offensive counterpart.

## When in doubt

If the target's surface or behavior doesn't cleanly match one tactic, run a **T01 + T05 probe** first — direct prompt injection and function-call abuse are the most common, highest-yield starting points and their results inform which other tactics are reachable.

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Imported from the listed AgentSkill.sh category. Complete supplied package files and notices are retained. Required external tools and credentials are not installed. No bundled code was executed during import. Individual agent task behavior has not been tested.