Apache Airflow DAG Patterns
Build production Apache Airflow DAGs with best practices for operators, sensors, testing, and deployment. Use when creating data pipelines, orchestrating workflows, or scheduling batch jobs.
5,487,579 AI resources indexedWorking toward the world’s largest AI resource index.
Adversaries may enumerate local drives, disks, and/or volumes and their attributes like total or free space and volume serial number.
---
name: t1680-local-storage-discovery-2b22ccc89c4c
description: "Adversaries may enumerate local drives, disks, and/or volumes and their attributes like total or free space and volume serial number."
category: "information-gathering"
version: "18.1"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
- mitre-attack
- enterprise
- t1680
- discovery
- esxi
- iaas
- linux
- macos
- windows
technique_id: "T1680"
tactic: "discovery"
all_tactics:
- discovery
platforms:
- ESXi
- IaaS
- Linux
- macOS
- Windows
mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1680"
tech_stack:
- esxi
- cloud
- linux
- macos
- windows
cwe_ids:
- CWE-200
chains_with: []
prerequisites: []
severity_boost: {}
---
# T1680 Local Storage Discovery
## High-Level Description
Adversaries may enumerate local drives, disks, and/or volumes and their attributes like total or free space and volume serial number. This can be done to prepare for ransomware-related encryption, to perform Lateral Movement, or as a precursor to Direct Volume Access.
On ESXi systems, adversaries may use Hypervisor CLI commands such as `esxcli` to list storage connected to the host as well as `.vmdk` files.
On Windows systems, adversaries can use `wmic logicaldisk get` to find information about local network drives. They can also use `Get-PSDrive` in PowerShell to retrieve drives and may additionally use Windows API functions such as `GetDriveType`.
Linux has commands such as `parted`, `lsblk`, `fdisk`, `lshw`, and `df` that can list information about disk partitions such as size, type, file system types, and free space. The command `diskutil` on MacOS can be used to list disks while `system_profiler SPStorageDataType` can additionally show information such as a volume’s mount path, file system, and the type of drive in the system.
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers also have commands for storage discovery such as `describe volume` in AWS, `gcloud compute disks list` in GCP, and `az disk list` in Azure.
## Kill Chain Phase
- Discovery (TA0007)
**Platforms:** ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
## What to Check
- [ ] Identify if Local Storage Discovery technique is applicable to target environment
- [ ] Check ESXi systems for indicators of Local Storage Discovery
- [ ] Check IaaS systems for indicators of Local Storage Discovery
- [ ] Check Linux systems for indicators of Local Storage Discovery
- [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)
## How to Test
### Manual Testing
1. **Identify Attack Surface**: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Local Storage Discovery by examining the target platforms (ESXi, IaaS, Linux).
2. **Assess Existing Defenses**: Review whether mitigations for T1680 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.
3. **Execute Test**: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.
> **Note**: No Atomic Red Team tests available for this technique. See [Atomic Red Team GitHub](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team) for updates.
## Remediation Guide
No specific mitigations documented for this technique.
## Detection
### Local Storage Discovery via Drive Enumeration and Filesystem Probing
## Risk Assessment
| Finding | Severity | Impact |
| -------------------------------------------- | -------- | --------- |
| Local Storage Discovery technique applicable | Medium | Discovery |
## CWE Categories
| CWE ID | Title |
| ------- | --------------------------------- |
| CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information |
## References
- [Volexity](https://www.volexity.com/blog/2023/06/28/charming-kitten-updates-powerstar-with-an-interplanetary-twist/)
- [AWS docs describe volumes](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ec2/describe-volumes.html)
- [azure az disk](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/disk?view=azure-cli-latest)
- [GCP gcloud compute disks list](https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/disks/list)
- [TrendMicro ESXI Ransomware](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/a/analysis-and-Impact-of-lockbit-ransomwares-first-linux-and-vmware-esxi-variant.html)
- [Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/i/earth-preta-new-malware-and-strategies.html)
- [TrendMicro](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/e/darkside-linux-vms-targeted.html)
- [Atomic Red Team - T1680](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/tree/master/atomics/T1680)
- [MITRE ATT&CK - T1680](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1680)
---
name: t1680-local-storage-discovery-2b22ccc89c4c
description: "Adversaries may enumerate local drives, disks, and/or volumes and their attributes like total or free space and volume serial number."
category: "information-gathering"
version: "18.1"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
- mitre-attack
- enterprise
- t1680
- discovery
- esxi
- iaas
- linux
- macos
- windows
technique_id: "T1680"
tactic: "discovery"
all_tactics:
- discovery
platforms:
- ESXi
- IaaS
- Linux
- macOS
- Windows
mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1680"
tech_stack:
- esxi
- cloud
- linux
- macos
- windows
cwe_ids:
- CWE-200
chains_with: []
prerequisites: []
severity_boost: {}
---
# T1680 Local Storage Discovery
## High-Level Description
Adversaries may enumerate local drives, disks, and/or volumes and their attributes like total or free space and volume serial number. This can be done to prepare for ransomware-related encryption, to perform Lateral Movement, or as a precursor to Direct Volume Access.
On ESXi systems, adversaries may use Hypervisor CLI commands such as `esxcli` to list storage connected to the host as well as `.vmdk` files.
On Windows systems, adversaries can use `wmic logicaldisk get` to find information about local network drives. They can also use `Get-PSDrive` in PowerShell to retrieve drives and may additionally use Windows API functions such as `GetDriveType`.
Linux has commands such as `parted`, `lsblk`, `fdisk`, `lshw`, and `df` that can list information about disk partitions such as size, type, file system types, and free space. The command `diskutil` on MacOS can be used to list disks while `system_profiler SPStorageDataType` can additionally show information such as a volume’s mount path, file system, and the type of drive in the system.
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers also have commands for storage discovery such as `describe volume` in AWS, `gcloud compute disks list` in GCP, and `az disk list` in Azure.
## Kill Chain Phase
- Discovery (TA0007)
**Platforms:** ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
## What to Check
- [ ] Identify if Local Storage Discovery technique is applicable to target environment
- [ ] Check ESXi systems for indicators of Local Storage Discovery
- [ ] Check IaaS systems for indicators of Local Storage Discovery
- [ ] Check Linux systems for indicators of Local Storage Discovery
- [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)
## How to Test
### Manual Testing
1. **Identify Attack Surface**: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Local Storage Discovery by examining the target platforms (ESXi, IaaS, Linux).
2. **Assess Existing Defenses**: Review whether mitigations for T1680 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.
3. **Execute Test**: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.
> **Note**: No Atomic Red Team tests available for this technique. See [Atomic Red Team GitHub](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team) for updates.
## Remediation Guide
No specific mitigations documented for this technique.
## Detection
### Local Storage Discovery via Drive Enumeration and Filesystem Probing
## Risk Assessment
| Finding | Severity | Impact |
| -------------------------------------------- | -------- | --------- |
| Local Storage Discovery technique applicable | Medium | Discovery |
## CWE Categories
| CWE ID | Title |
| ------- | --------------------------------- |
| CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information |
## References
- [Volexity](https://www.volexity.com/blog/2023/06/28/charming-kitten-updates-powerstar-with-an-interplanetary-twist/)
- [AWS docs describe volumes](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ec2/describe-volumes.html)
- [azure az disk](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/disk?view=azure-cli-latest)
- [GCP gcloud compute disks list](https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/disks/list)
- [TrendMicro ESXI Ransomware](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/a/analysis-and-Impact-of-lockbit-ransomwares-first-linux-and-vmware-esxi-variant.html)
- [Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/i/earth-preta-new-malware-and-strategies.html)
- [TrendMicro](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/e/darkside-linux-vms-targeted.html)
- [Atomic Red Team - T1680](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/tree/master/atomics/T1680)
- [MITRE ATT&CK - T1680](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1680)
Imported from the listed AgentSkill.sh category. Complete supplied package files and notices are retained. Required external tools and credentials are not installed. No bundled code was executed during import. Individual agent task behavior has not been tested.